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Abstract
In this paper a Cournot-like model is constructed with an iso-elastic demand
function for n competitors. The Cournot equilibrium is constructed for gen-
eral constant unit costs. Finally, it is proved that for identical unit costs the
Cournot point is a sink for two or three competitors and a saddle for more
than four players.
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1. Introduction
There are two opposing market forms in economics: competition and
monopoly. In the case of competition, firms are numerous and hence small
in comparison to the size of the total market, and they consider the market
price to be exogenously determined. In a monopoly, only one firm supplies
the market and supply influences the market price appreciably.
An oligopoly is a market form in which a market has a dominant influence
on a small number of sellers (oligopolists). Since there are few sellers, each
oligopolist is likely to be aware of the actions of the others. Each seller has
an influence on, and is influenced by, the decisions of the other oligopolists.
Hence, the planning of each oligopolist needs to take into account the re-
sponses of the other competitors. In an oligopoly, there are at least two
firms controlling the market. If there are two sellers, it is called a duopoly;
∗Department of Applied Mathematics & IT4Innovations. VSˇB - Technical University
of Ostrava, 17. listopadu 15/2172, 708 33 Ostrava, Czech Republic.
Email address: marek.lampart@vsb.cz (Marek Lampart)
Preprint submitted to Chaos, Solitons & Fractals May 31, 2012
DSpace VŠB-TUO http://hdl.handle.net/10084/95693 15/11/2012
while if there are three competitors, it is known as a triopoly. The first treat-
ment of oligopoly was proposed by A. Cournot, in 1838 [4], for a duopoly.
Significant additions to the theory were made exactly one hundred years later
by H. von Stackelberg [12].
A question in microeconomics is whether an increase in the number of
competitors in a market defines a path to perfect competition. It was stated
by [13] (see also [8] page 237) that the oligopoly model produced under con-
stant marginal costs with a linear demand function is neutrally stable for
three competitors and unstable for more than three competitors. The argu-
ment for this fact can be found in [11]. As discussed in [11], linear demand
functions are very easy to use, but they do not avoid negative supplies and
prices, so it is possible to use them only for the study of local behavior. This
problem can be solved by using nonlinear demand functions such as piecewise
linear functions or other more complex functions, one of which was suggested
by [9] for a dupoly and later by [10] for a triopoly using iso-elastic demand
functions. These types of demand function were later studied by [1] and
[2] for a nonlinear (iso-elastic) demand function and constant marginal costs
and it was concluded that this Cournot model for n competitors is neutrally
stable if n = 4 and is unstable if the number of competitors is greater than
five (see also [11]).
The main aim of this paper is to consider Cournot points and discuss their
stability while the number of players is increasing for the model with an iso-
elastic demand function and under the assumption that the firms’ costs are
identical. The terminology of dynamical systems is used, that is the Cournot
point is identified as a fixed one.
A discrete dynamical system is an ordered pair (X, f) where X is stan-
dardly taken to be a compact metric space and f is a continuous map from
X to, but not necessarily onto, X. So, X is invariant under f , that is
f(X) ⊂ X. A point x ∈ X is fixed if f(x) = x and a set of all fixed points of
the map f is denoted by Fix(f). For t ∈ N, the t-th iterate of f is the t-fold
composition f t = f ◦ . . . ◦ f , where f 0 is the identity map.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section the Cournot
iso-elastic model with n competitors is derived, and the model is constructed
as a discrete dynamical system (Xn, Fn). In the third section it is proved
that the Cournot point is a sink for n = 2, 3 and is a saddle for n > 4. It
is known that for n = 4 the Cournot point is neutrally stable (see e.g. [1]
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or [11]). Finally, in the last section the analogous results are discussed that
were given in the previous section on a model with the assumption that firms
compete with their closest competitors in either direction.
2. The Cournot iso-elastic model for N competitors
The following construction is inspired by the work of T. Puu [9] who
constructed the model for two competitors (later in [10] for three players).
This model could be extended for n firms.
Assuming that the level of demand is reciprocal to price p, this represents
an “iso-elastic” demand function reflecting a case where consumers always
spend a constant sum on the commodity, regardless of price. Inverting the
demand function gives
p =
1
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn , (1)
where the total quantity in the denominator is the sum of the supplies and
xi are competitors, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The revenues of these firms equal price times quantity
pxi =
xi
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn . (2)
Assuming that the firms operate under constant unit costs ci, so ci > 0 for
any i. Their total costs are cixi. So, the profits become
Πi(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
xi
x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn − cixi. (3)
In order to maximize profits for the firm put a partial derivative of (3) with
respect to xi equal to zero
∂Πi
∂xi
= 0, (4)
and these reaction functions are derived
x1(x2, x3, . . . , xn) =
√
x2 + x3 + . . .+ xn
c1
− (x2 + x3 + . . .+ xn),
x2(x1, x3, . . . , xn) =
√
x1 + x3 + . . .+ xn
c2
− (x1 + x3 + . . .+ xn),
...
xn(x2, x3, . . . , xn−1) =
√
x2 + x3 + . . .+ xn−1
cn
− (x2 + x3 + . . .+ xn−1).
(5)
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Introducing the adjustment process explicitly, from (5) the following are ob-
tained
xt1 =
√
xt−12 + x
t−1
3 + . . .+ x
t−1
n
c1
− (xt−12 + xt−13 + . . .+ xt−1n ),
xt2 =
√
xt−11 + x
t−1
3 + . . .+ x
t−1
n
c2
− (xt−11 + xt−13 + . . .+ xt−1n ),
...
xtn =
√
xt−12 + x
t−1
3 + . . .+ x
t−1
n−1
cn
− (xt−12 + xt−13 + . . .+ xt−1n−1).
(6)
Thus, a dynamical system is deduced
(Xn, Fn) (7)
defined as follows for n ≥ 2.
Denote
x = (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn)
and define operator (i•)
(ix) =
∑
j∈Ni
xj
where N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} and Ni = N \ {i}.
Firstly, set
Fn : Rn → Rn
defined by
x 7→
√(1x)
c1
− (1x),
√
(2x)
c2
− (2x), . . . ,
√
(nx)
cn
− (nx)
 .
Secondly, the invariant set Xn is found. It is clear that the domain of Fn
is
Dn =
{
(ix) ≥ 0, for any i} .
Such a model is being considered so that the process can be repeated, thus
focussing on a subset of Dn for which F
t
n(x) ∈ Dn for any t ≥ 0. Such points
in Dn are admissible (see [3]). Unfortunately, not all admissible points are
4
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Figure 1: Cournot equilibrium in the second dimension
meaningful. Since economic interpretation of a point with negative value is
not acceptable the attention has to be restricted to feasible points. The first
iteration needs to be taken into account. To do this, this system of equations
has to be solved
(ix) =
1
ci
, (8)
Solving system (8) gives the solution
xi =
1
n− 1
(
i(1/c)
)
+ (2− n)ci, (9)
where 1/c = (1/c1, 1/c2, . . . , 1/cn). Denoting xi by ai, a set is obtained, such
that all their points are feasible for the first iteration. Repeating this process
for all iterations gives
Xn ⊂ [0, a1]× [0, a2]× . . .× [0, an] ⊂ Dn (10)
which is invariant under Fn, see Figure 1 for the second-dimensional case.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to ascertain the set Xn explicitly.
Notice that
Fn(a1, a2, . . . , an) = (0, 0, . . . , 0),
and that the spaces X3, X4 are not well constructed e.g. in [6] and [7]. The
space X2 = [0, 1/c2] × [0, 1/c1] is implicitly given in [14], and this can be
compared with (9) and (10). It is also easy to see that a fixed point x? of Fn
is the Cournot equilibrium (Nash equilibrium of the game) (see e.g. [3]).
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3. Stability of the Cournot equilibrium of the model
A fixed point p for f : Rn → Rn is called hyperbolic if Df(p) has no
eigenvalues on the unite circle, where Df(p) is the Jacobian matrix of f at
the point p. Such a hyperbolic point p is
1. a sink fixed point if all eigenvalues of Df(p) are less than one in absolute
value,
2. a source fixed point if all eigenvalues of Df(p) are greater than one in
absolute value,
3. a saddle fixed point otherwise, i.e., if some eigenvalues of Df(p) are
less and some larger than one in absolute value.
Proposition 1 ([5]). Supposing that f : Rn → Rn has a sink fixed point p.
Then there is an open set containing p in which all points tend to p under
forward iteration of f .
The largest such open set in Rn is called the stable set of p and is denoted
by W s(p).
Proposition 2 ([5]). Supposing that f : Rn → Rn has a source fixed point
p. Then there is an open set containing p in which all points tend to p under
backward iteration of f .
The largest such open set in Rn is called the unstable set of p and is denoted
by W u(p).
The stability of the Cournot point has been discussed for two or three
players. The case for two competitors was discussed in [14]. For n = 2
Fix(F2) =
{
(0, 0),
(
c2
(c1 + c2)2
,
c1
(c1 + c2)2
)}
.
In [3] the situation is for n = 3
Fix(F3) =
{
(0, 0, 0),
(
2(−c1 + c2 + c3)
(c1 + c2 + c3)2
,
2(c1 − c2 + c3)
(c1 + c2 + c3)2
,
2(c1 + c2 − c3)
(c1 + c2 + c3)2
)}
.
Note that the first part of Theorem 2 in [7] is not correct. The mistake is in
the section “Proof of Theorem 2”. Taking c3 = c1 + c2 it is concluded “does
not provide any fixed point different from the origin”. Yet, the second fixed
point is (c2/(c1 + c2)
2, c1/(c1 + c2)
2, 0).
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Theorem 3. Let n ≥ 2 and (Xn, Fn) be a dynamical system (7). Then
Fix(Fn) = {f0, f1}
where
f0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0),
f1 =
(
(n− 1)(1c)
c2
,
(n− 1)(2c)
c2
, . . . ,
(n− 1)(nc)
c2
)
,
c =
∑
j∈{1,2,...,n}
cj,
(ic) =
∑
j∈Ni
cj + (2− n)ci.
Proof. The following is going to be solved
Fn(x) = x. (11)
It is easy to see that f0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) is a trivial solution. Assuming that
x 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0). From (11) a system of equations is elicited√
(ix)
ci
− (ix) = xi, (12)
and hence √
(ix)
ci
= x. (13)
Giveing
(1x)
c1
=
(2x)
c2
= . . . =
(nx)
cn
(14)
a system of (n− 1) linear equations with n parameters. Now, parameters ci
are expressed, and each ci depends on all xj where j ∈ Ni. Putting these
parameters into (12) the following solution is obtained
f1 =
(
(n− 1)(1c)
c2
,
(n− 1)(2c)
c2
, . . . ,
(n− 1)(nc)
c2
)
,
c =
∑
j∈{1,2,...,n}
cj,
7
DSpace VŠB-TUO http://hdl.handle.net/10084/95693 15/11/2012
(ic) =
∑
j∈Ni
cj + (2− n)ci
thus finalising the proof.
It is worth noting how to calculate the image of f1. Firstly, the following
is simplified
(n− 1)
∑
j∈N1
(jc) = (n− 1)
∑
k∈N2
(∑
j∈Nk
cj + (2− n)ck
)
= (n− 1)2c1. (15)
From (15) the first coordinate of Fn(f1) is equal to the first coordinate of f1:√
(n− 1)2c1/(2c)
c1
− (n− 1)
2c1
c2
=
(n− 1)(1c)
c2
.
The remaining coordinates can be verified analogously.
From now on it is assumed that the oligopolists’ products have identical
marginal costs, that is ci = c for any i. Then using Theorem 3 the following
is deduced
Fix(Fn) =
{
(0, 0, . . . , 0),
(
(n− 1)
cn2
,
(n− 1)
cn2
, . . . ,
(n− 1)
cn2
)}
.
The following lemma plays a key role in the proof of the main result,
Theorem 5.
Lemma 4. Let A be an n× n matrix
A =

a 1 1 . . . 1
1 a 1 . . . 1
1 1 a . . . 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 1 . . . a
 .
Then det(A) = (a+ n− 1)(a− 1)n−1.
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Proof. It is easy to see that
α1 = (1, 1, 1, . . . , 1, 1) e1 = (a+ n− 1),
α2 = (1,−1, 0, . . . , 0, 0) e2 = (a− 1),
α3 = (0, 1,−1, . . . , 0, 0) e3 = (a− 1),
...
...
αn = (0, 0, 0 . . . , 1,−1) en = (a− 1)
are eigenvectors with corresponding eigenvalues of the matrix A, thus com-
pleting the proof.
Theorem 5. If ci = c for any i, then for a dynamical system (Xn, Fn) (7):
(i) dimW u(f0) = n and dimW
s(f0) = 0 for any n ≥ 2,
(ii) dimW u(f1) = 0 and dimW
s(f1) = n for n = 2, 3,
(iii) for n = 4 the point f1 is not hyperbolic, moreover dimW
s(f1) ≥ 3,
(iv) dimW u(f1) = 1 and dimW
s(f1) = n− 1 for any n > 4.
Proof. The Jacobi matrix of Fn at the point x is
DFn(x) =

0 1
2
√
c
(1x)
−1/2 − 1 . . . 1
2
√
c
(1x)
−1/2 − 1
1
2
√
c
(2x)
−1/2 − 1 0 . . . 1
2
√
c
(2x)
−1/2 − 1
...
...
. . .
...
1
2
√
c
(nx)−1/2 − 1 1
2
√
c
(nx)−1/2 − 1 . . . 0
 .
Firstly, partial derivatives of Fn at the point f0 that appear in the Jacobi
matrix tend to infinity while x tends to f0. So, the point f0 is unstable in all
directions, thus proving (i).
Secondly, constructing a Jacobi matrix of Fn at the point f1 and looking
for its eigenvalues, the following is obtained
DFn(f1) =

0 n
2(n−1) − 1 . . . n2(n−1) − 1
n
2(n−1) − 1 0 . . . n2(n−1) − 1
...
...
. . .
...
n
2(n−1) − 1 n2(n−1) − 1 . . . 0
 .
Now,
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det (DFn(f0)− λI) =
(
2− n
2(n− 1)
)n
det(M)
where
M =

−λ2(n−1)
2−n 1 1 . . . 1
1 −λ2(n−1)
2−n 1 . . . 1
1 1 −λ2(n−1)
2−n . . . 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 1 . . . −λ2(n−1)
2−n
 .
So, according to Lemma 4 the following may be now deduced
det (DFn(f1)− λI) =
(
2− n
2(n− 1)
)n(
−λ2(n− 1)
2− n + n− 1
)(
−λ2(n− 1)
2− n − 1
)n−1
.
There are two different real roots
λ1 = 1− n
2
,
λ2 =
n− 2
2(n− 1)
where the first one is with one multiple and the second one with n−1 multiple.
Their absolute values are
n = 2, 3 n = 4 n > 4
|λ1| < 1 = 1 > 1
|λ2| < 1 < 1 < 1
To finalize the proof it is sufficient to use vectors in the proof Lemma 4
to generate suitable subspaces of the range space Rn, proving (ii), (iii) and
(iv).
Corollary 6. The fixed point f0 of Fn is a source for any n ≥ 2 and ci = c.
Corollary 7. The Cournot point f1 of Fn is a sink for any n = 2, 3 and
ci = c.
Corollary 8. The Cournot point f1 of Fn is a saddle for any n > 4 and
ci = c.
10
DSpace VŠB-TUO http://hdl.handle.net/10084/95693 15/11/2012
4. Conclusion
The Cournot point was constructed for (Xn, Fn) and for general unit costs
in Theorem 3 and its stability discussed under the additional assumption that
the unit costs are identical for all firms in Theorem 5. The Cournot point
is a sink for two and three competitors according to Corollary 7 and is a
saddle for more than four competitors by Corollary 8, under the assumption
of constant marginal costs. It is known that for n = 4 the Cournot point
is neutrally stable (see e.g. [1] or [11]). Unfortunately, it is not so easy to
discuss stability for n competitors in the general case (ci are different for each
i); the situation is more complex and needs in-depth study for each case. The
general situation for a triopoly was studied in [3].
It is possible to construct a model “a` la Cournot” with the assumption
that the firms compete with their closest competitors in either direction. Such
systems are equal to (Xn, Fn) for n = 2, 3. The system for four competitors
was introduced in [6] where (x1, x2, x3, x4) is mapped to (y1, y2, y3, y4) and
y1 =
√
x2 + x4
c1
− (x2 + x4), y2 =
√
x1 + x3
c2
− (x1 + x3),
y3 =
√
x2 + x4
c3
− (x2 + x4), y4 =
√
x1 + x3
c4
− (x1 + x3).
It is also possible to extend this idea to dimension n and get Cournot equi-
libria under the assumption ci = c for any i. In this case
Fix(Fn) =
{
(0, 0, . . . , 0),
(
2
9c
,
2
9c
, . . . ,
2
9c
)}
.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to use ideas of (12), (13) and (14) from
the proof of Theorem 3 to get the Cournot point for general ci because the
model is more complex. So, how to solve this problem for general number of
competitors, is still an unsolved question.
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